文/莊靜採訪整理報導
編者按:感謝德文系系主任鍾英彥及英文系助理教授陳吉斯,在本專題採訪時,協助以不同語言翻譯說明,其中哲學專有名詞採陳吉斯解釋說明。
緣起
本校德文系教授狄殷豪致力於「探討哲學之可能性」,在他高中時,由於非常景仰學者Theordor W. Adorno,因此努力地研讀他的著作《Dialectic of Enlightenment》和《Negative Dialectics》,即使內容深奧,狄殷豪仍想追隨Adorno的腳步,然而,這位學者在1969年便辭世了。
狄殷豪在慕尼黑大學文學與哲學研究所中,L.B. Puntel是他的碩博士論文指導教授,尤其在黑格爾《邏輯科學》中,他教導狄殷豪如何閱讀哲學文章,在他的研究初期有著非常重要的影響性。在慕尼黑的求學時光,狄殷豪也藉由看電影、聽歌劇,從當中印證自己的哲學思想與視野。
研究主軸
「探討哲學之可能性」是狄殷豪的主要研究方向,他的研究以認識論中的兩大議題─「回憶與辨識」(Anamnesis and Recognition)為主軸,主張哲學議題的可能性建立在尋求方法,特別是尋找一種可以趨近與掌握我們在此時此地所經歷問題的語言。黑格爾的《邏輯科學》正是在追求這種方法和語言。
狄殷豪博士論文,以黑格爾《邏輯科學》為主題,以在二十世紀大災難(第二次世界大戰、車諾比事件)所經歷過的問題為參考背景,嘗試找出這部作品的盲點。黑格爾將在此時此地經歷問題的無數種概念化方式視為一種延續體,可供研究者在不同觀點之間轉變。但與二十世紀大災難比較,包括殖民問題,黑格爾這種哲學態度透露某種化眾異為一同的暴力性。早期法蘭克福學派(Adorno)和後結構主義皆以不同術語強調必需保護「異己」免於被化約為「同一」。化約主義的理解延續性方式乃建立於「回憶」(Anamnesis);而非化約式的不同觀點之間轉變─是一種「辨識」(Recognition)的思辯過程。狄殷豪的博士論文中,將「回憶」延伸至「辨識」,以分辨不同、處理差異為目的,讓社會的多元與變異不被刻板的觀念所束縛。
「什麼是哲學」以及「要以何途徑堅持對哲學的認知」是狄殷豪在研究中不斷探討的問題,他認為人類每日在生活中所發生的事情和困難,都有其哲理,值得深思,關心時事更是研究哲學必備的態度。因此,狄殷豪常以時事議題做為研究的參考,再三地重讀傳統哲學的偉大文本,另一方面不斷地努力與現實生活中原始事件密切接觸。來回在日常事件與哲學經典之間中,藉由哲學大家所主張的概念與現代時事激盪,擦撞出事件所帶來的最大價值。
學思歷程
狄殷豪的研究深受70年代早期在慕尼黑大學許多學者的陶冶,慕尼黑大學是一個啟發人心和靈感的地方,當時各種哲學流派相繼在哲學系中出現,狄殷豪的研究深受許多學者的教誨,他舉例如:現象學家Bernard Waldenfels帶領狄殷豪認識德國著名哲學家胡賽爾,德國哲學家Robert Spaemann則透過發表演說和開班講授倫理學和政治哲學。在致力於研究「科學哲學」的研究所中,Wolfgang Stegmüller教導他如何因應由Thomas S. Kuhn在《科學革命的結構》(The Structure of Scientific Revolutions)一書所帶來的「哲學地震」。狄殷豪尤其感謝L.B. Puntel和哲學家Otfried Höffe幫助他成為德國學術研究獎助基金會(German Scholarship Foundation)的一員,使他從大學時代到在慕尼黑攻讀博士學位的過程中,都能得到機構的支持,如:在牛津大學的第一個學期,哲學家Geoffrey Warnock對他的導師個別指導。
在研究黑格爾《邏輯科學》的過程中,狄殷豪察覺以老生常談的思想處理時事,例如二十世紀大災難,並無法進行全盤了解,而透過「辨識」則能完整地體察事件的意涵,然而「辨識」的過程是不同思想的集結,需要透過精讀哲學大家的文章論述、傾聽各種意見和了解多元文化並與生活連結,才能使決策和思想更為精闢、客觀。然而,即使理解時事和深入了解不同派別的哲學家一樣重要,倘若忽視某一方,會使思想成為泛泛之談,如此也使自己的想法失去平衡,也是他所面臨的挑戰。
然而,時間的限制使狄殷豪無法進行每一項研究,為克服上述不平衡的狀態,他強調,自己必須更努力地從生活中實踐。每年春季,狄殷豪開授「時事與歷史」課程,透過全球議題和現今事件與學生分享討論,並引領學生剖析事件,建立學生的思想邏輯與深度,「New York Times」、「BBC News」或議題文章都是他的授課教材,藉由教學狄殷豪在研究哲學的思維上,也能有所突破,狄殷豪說:「這是我追求思想平衡的方式之一,對我而言,此種挑戰充滿刺激,而我也希望能夠將這種刺激和興奮的研究探討精神感染給我的學生。」在多變的時代下,他感謝學生帶給他的幫助,透過意見交流,教學相長。
狄殷豪也在本校教授〈德語會話〉、〈德國文學史〉與〈德文作文〉等課程。目前正修習狄殷豪〈德語會話〉課程的德文二黃于庭說:「老師最特別的地方在於他的耐心!他非常地了解臺灣學生的問題在於聽力和不敢說,所以他的課程中,會一直不斷訓練我們『提問』的能力,並促進思考,因此在這堂課中,不僅能訓練聽力,有助建立德語會話的思維」此外,她也強調,狄殷豪上課尤重「思考」,他認為學生的德語對談不流利,在學習過程中是有益的,也顯示學生在「思考」問題。
研究成果
德文系系主任鍾英彥表示,狄殷豪的哲學基礎扎實,在學生時期1980年代,便與同好共同出版哲學雜誌《Zeno》,此雜誌在德國的哲學界富有盛名。此外,狄殷豪曾於1990年代,獲得4次國科會研究成果獎,哲學研究的成果備受肯定。在教育方面,狄殷豪定期在學術研討會中,分享哲學文章,將自己的理念與他人交流。鍾英彥認為,狄殷豪的哲學專業為系上的課程結構,提供寶貴的意見。
曾為狄殷豪的博士生,現為英文系助理教授陳吉斯回憶,狄殷豪在擔任地球村語言及文化研究中心主任時,曾推動許多跨學科與跨國的學術活動,如:哲學讀書會,參與系所有英文、德文、法文、俄文系等系師生。跨國學術交流,如:中德交換學者移地研究、網路學術研討會、實地學術研討會,「狄教授成功的營造一個熱情的學術研究氛圍。」
在狄殷豪的研究歷程中,為了找尋重建「辨識」的理解,採取迂迴路線而開始做比較哲學。比較哲學概念或哲學傳統,偏向談論哲學而不是做哲學,在此階段的著作有:〈哲學與比較哲學〉(1990);研究里維納斯的小書Denkverläufe. Untersuchungen zu Emmanuel Levinas(1996),鑽研他早期作品《存在與存有物》(Exitence and Existents)。
狄殷豪提及,傳統哲學的文章書籍,有助於對哲理的洞察及概念的建立,文本中所談及的道理都和我們的日常遭遇有著極大的意義和關聯,倘若能跳脫其中,客觀地面對問題,便能凸顯這些文章的可貴獨特之處。根據黑格爾的《邏輯科學》,狄殷豪認為「我們可以了解的事物和思維,包含事件本身為概念,試著了解這些概念彼此之間的關係並將想法串連,這是很重要的」,因為任何事情,依據切入者角度的不同,而產生不同的說法或觀念。狄殷豪以顏色「藍綠色」為例,對甲者而言,藍綠色是藍色和綠色的混合色;對乙者而言,藍綠色是獨一無二的顏色,而經過討論後,才能將兩種切入點連結在一起,這是「辨識」而非「記憶」所能達到的結果。綜觀哲學的研究心得,狄殷豪強調,「學習接受不同的聲音,不以刻版印象來決策。」他舉例,在全球化的浪潮下,各種文化和思想都環環相扣,然而本土化的特色也易被全球化所蒙蔽,狄殷豪認為,如果一件事我們所接收到的訊息是不完整的,思考其價值觀從報章雜誌中吸取,不見得可以得知真實的面向及意涵。因此,他建議想研究哲學的後進,「可以先從報紙社論著手,關注其中的概念,不要視其為理所當然;再去對照舊報紙就會發現過去許多概念,有許多都是錯誤的;而哲學的書籍,如柏拉圖,就應讀柏拉圖的原著,才能悟得其中哲學的真義。」
Anamnesis and Recognition:哲學之可能性的研究進程
文/狄殷豪
In my MA-project I tried to develop some thoughts on the difference between the understanding of logic as we find it in Wittgenstein`s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus on the one hand and Hegel`s The Science of Logic on the other. My PhD work pursued the topic Anamnesis and Recognition. The subtitle, Investigations on the Possibility of Philosophy, describes my research interest since then: If there is anything we may consider the perennial concern of philosophy, it must be there right in front of us, a concern we always already have been and are involved with when dealing with whatever we have to deal with. Doing philosophy depends upon finding ways and above all a language capable of reformulating and refigurating its concern in such a way that we are recognizing it as a concern emerging from and through issues and concerns we are facing in the middle of events here and now.
In one of his early texts, and we are talking here about the time around 1800, Hegel characterizes the need philosophy is responding to as emerging from a radicalized and further radicalizing encounter with fragmentation, disjointedness, strife, in German: “Zerrissenheit”. Hegel’s The Science of Logic is an attempt of thinking through the myriad possibilities of looking at things as a continuum that allows meaningful, traceable and therefore, although that certainly is not as Hegel would have put it, negotiable transitions. To a perspective after the catastrophes of the 20th century, colonization included, various forms and shades of conceptual violence began shining through some of the procedures Hegel had used in that project. The earlier Frankfurt School (Adorno) as well as Poststructuralists later on highlighted the “other” in need of protection against being reduced to the “same”. In my terminology, an understanding of continuity in reductionist terms is based upon anamnesis. What I was after in my dissertation was a non-reductionist procedure of transition between modes of thought. I used recognition as a guiding concept for doing so .
I did not get much further than outlining the problem. Looking for ways of reworking the understanding of recognition as we find it in the early Hegel for the mentioned purpose, I tried a detour into comparative philosophy. Comparing philosophical ideas or even philosophical traditions, however, tends to make us more inclined towards talking about philosophy rather than doing philosophy. I had not quite realized this yet when writing my paper “Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy”. At the same time, as becomes obvious when looking back at this paper from the present perspective, it appears I had moved into another direction without realizing that either.
Within the framing passages of that paper, as part of a reflection on what philosophy was all about, I linked that question to human self-understanding and from there to history. What we as humans are is what history shows. The more detailed we are looking into history, the less inspiring the human self-image we are finding there. Exactly that, however, the fact disappointment, desperation, even horror are emerging when we are looking at our image in history, is what we are as well. The perennial concern of philosophy has to do with that. Remaining a mere sketch in the mentioned paper, that point led into another detour. I wrote a brief book on Levinas, focusing on the early work Existence and Existents. The formation of a philosophical language through exposure to what is and has been happening and returning from there can be studied there sentence by sentence. It is a philosophical language strong enough to avoid freezing into a jargon.
In spring 2002 I began offering the course “Historical Background of Current Events”. The idea of that course is to follow events as they are happening from week to week by exploring stories as they develop and above all attempts of making sense as we find them in editorials and elsewhere. I have been teaching that course since then every spring. In autumn 2010 I began supplementing it by a course on recent history, putting together there the most important results of the course on what then had been current events. The observation of how attempts of making sense tend to rely on jargons melting away faster and faster from year to year has been a staggering one. It appears we cannot afford relying on jargons any more, not in attempts of making sense and because of that even less in philosophy. The formation of a philosophical language with some resistance towards freezing into jargon is one of the philosophical problems we are facing within and through what we are facing, from week to week, here and now.
Since 2003 I tried a few steps into that direction. All except one of the nine papers belonging to that project have been published in “Iablis-Yearbook for European Processes”. With the final one, “Wisdom of Shame”, a point has been reached from where a return to the recognition-project could be possible. Any understanding of recognition adequate to what we are facing today and will be facing even more so in the future has to take into account the new quality of the struggle for resources that just has begun to emerge. Reframing and rephrasing situations of conflict as win-win situations will increasingly turn out to be difficult. Meaningful transitions between conflicting options of looking at matters will be no less difficult under such circumstances. As I presently see it, recognition as a basis for making that possible will only work if the guiding understanding of recognition includes as one of its formative elements a particular understanding of shame. The final one of the Iablis-Papers mentioned tries to begin exploring this.